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L Facts
OnJanuary 30,1983, Donald A. Mapes and Randy Newton robbed Chap's
Bar in Cleveland, Ohio.' During the robbery, Mapes shotJohn Allen, the owner
of the bar, in the face with a sawed-off shotgun.2 Eyewitness John Hovekamp
identified Mapes as the shooter after viewing both a photographic array and a
police lineup.3 The police arrested Mapes's accomplice, Newton, on March 4,
1983." Newton gave the police a statement implicating Mapes as the gunman and
leading them to the discovery of shotgun shells similar to those used to kill
Allen.5
Ohio prosecutors charged Mapes with aggravated murder during the course
of an aggravated robbery and during the course of an aggravated burglary under
Ohio Revised Code section 2903.01 (B).' Each count carried with it three death
penalty specifications: murder in the course of an aggravated robbery, murder
in the course of an aggravated burglary, and a prior murder conviction.7 The jury
found Mapes guilty of both counts of aggravated murder but not guilty of the
two death penalty specifications under section 2929.04(A)(7)." In a separate
proceeding, the trial court found Mapes guilty of the prior murder specification
because Mapes had made a no contest plea to a 1972 New Jersey murder indict-
ment.9 The jury then sentenced Mapes to death."
1. State v. Mapes, 484 N.E.2d 140, 141-42 (Ohio 1985). The facts important to this
casenote are found in the "Syllabus by the Court" preceding the Supreme Court of Ohio's opinion.
2. Id. at 141.
3. Mapes v. Coyle, 171 F.3d 408, 411 (6th Cir. 1999).
4. Mapes, 484 N.E.2d at 142.
5. Id.
6. Id.; see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.01(B) (West Supp. 2004) (defining aggravated
murder as "purposely caus[ing] the death of another... while committing or attempting to commit
... aggravated robbery... [or] aggravated burglary").
7. Mapes, 484 N.E.2d at 142; see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(A)(7) (West Supp. 2004)
(allowing a death sentence if there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was
committed during the course of an aggravated robbery or burglary); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 5
2929.04(A)(5) (providing for a death sentence if "[p]rior to the offense at the bar, the offender was
convicted of an offense an essential element of which was the purposeful killing of or attempt to
kill [another]").
8. Mapes, 484 N.E.2d at 142.
9. Id. at 143.
10. Id.
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After the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed Mapes's conviction and sentence
on direct appeal and denied his habeas corpus petition for state postconviction
relief, Mapes filed a habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Ohio." Although his petition alleged fifteen constitu-
tional errors, the district court found merit only in the claim "that Mapes had
received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel by virtue of counsel's failure
to argue on direct appeal that the trial court had impermissibly precluded the jury
from considering mitigating factors related to Mapes's New Jersey murder
conviction."'" The district court consequently vacated Mapes's death sentence
on the condition that the Ohio state courts review the sentence within ninety
days. 3 Upon the State's appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit reversed in part and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. 4 The court
instructed the district court to determine the effectiveness of Mapes's appellate
counsel in failing to raise the following issues:
(1) that the jury was not allowed to consider mitigating evidence
relating to Mapes's prior murder conviction. . . ; (2) that the jury was
erroneously required to unanimously reject the death penalty before
considering a life sentence... ; (3) that juror Chatman gave an equivo-
cal response during pollin ... ; and (4) that trial counsel had been
constitutionally ineffective. 
In its second consideration of the appeal, the district court accepted the magis-
trate judge's determination, in light of an evidentiary hearing, that Mapes's
appellate counsel were ineffective and again granted Mapes relief conditionally,
requiring that the state court review the death sentence. 6 Again the State ap-
pealed, and Mapes cross-appealed, requesting that the court vacate his death
sentence instead of granting him a new appeal. 7
IL Holding
Denying both the State's and Mapes's appeals, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the
district court's conditional grant of habeas relief to Mapes." The court found
that a new appeal was the most appropriate remedy for ineffective assistance of
11. Mapes v. Tate, 388 F.3d 187, 189-90 (6th Cir. 2004); see Mapes, 484 N.E.2d at 149
(affirming Mapes's conviction and death sentence); State v. Mapes, 558 N.E.2d 57, 57 (Ohio 1990)
(denying postconviction relief).
12. Mapes, 388 F.3d at 190.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.; see Mapes, 171 F.3d at 427, 429 (instructing the district court to hold an evidentiary
hearing on appellate counsel's ineffectiveness).
16. Mapes, 388 F.3d at 190.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 189.
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appellate counsel because its task on this appeal was to "neutraz[e] the constitu-
tional deprivation suffered."' 9 The court recognized that Mapes may have
suffered constitutional violations during his sentencing proceeding, but it could
not address those violations because Mapes needed first to bring them before the
state courts.2" Accordingly, the court held that Mapes be granted "an opportu-
nity to pursue his direct appeal with effective assistance of counsel."'"
III. Anaysis
A. Standard of Review
Because Mapes filed his first federal habeas corpus petition in 1991, prior
to the 1996 effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
("AEDPA"), the Sixth Circuit originally applied the pre-AEDPA standard of
review to the district court's findings. 2 Under this standard, the court must
presume state findings of fact to be correct unless rebutted by clear and convinc-
ing evidence and must review de novo findings of law or mixed questions of law
and fact.2 3 "Because a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel raises mixed
questions of law and fact," the court reviewed the district court's findings de
novo.
24
B. Ineffective Assistance ofAppellate Counsel
The Sixth Circuit stated that under its own jurisprudence in Joshua v.
DeWitt,25 "[a] defendant is entitled to the effective assistance of counsel in his
first appeal of right."'26 The court stated that it should judge appellate counsel by
the same Strickland v. Washingtoi 7 standards with which it judges trial counsel:
counsel were ineffective if their performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness under the circumstances and if the deficient performance preju-
19. Id. at 195 (citing Magana v. Hofbauer, 263 F.3d 542, 553 (6th Cir. 2001)).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Mapes, 171 F.3d at 413; see Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. % 2244-2264 (2000)) (amending
the procedures for review of habeas corpus petitions in federal court).
23. Mapes, 171 F.3d at 413; see Richmond v. Bell, 131 F.3d 1150, 1153-54 (6th Cir. 1997)
(clarifying pre-AEDPA standards of review).
24. Mapes, 388 F.3d at 190; see United States v. Jackson, 181 F.3d 740, 744 (6th Cir. 1999)
(setting forth the circuit court's standard for reviewing district court findings).
25. 341 F.3d 430 (6th Cir. 2003).
26. Mapes, 388 F.3d at 191; seeJoshua v. DeWitt, 341 F.3d 430,441(6th Cir. 2003) (holding
that a defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel on his or her first
appeal of right).
27. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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diced the defense. 28 The court further refined its inquiry into the effectiveness
of appellate counsel by considering the issues counsel omitted, the procedural
requirements governing appeals, and the competence and effort of appellate
counsel. 29 Within the category concerning the issues omitted on appeal, the court
considered if the issues were " 'significant and obvious,' " subject to contrary
authority, "clearly stronger than those presented," and "dealt with in other
assignments of error. '30 Concerning procedure, the court determined whether
trial counsel objected to the issues and whether "the trial court's rulings [were]
subject to deference on appeal.",3' The court also questioned the competence
and actions of appellate counsel by investigating counsel's testimony in collateral
appeals about their appeal strategy and justifications, "level of experience and
expertise," discussion of the issues with the client, review of the facts of the
case, and strategy in omitting the issues.
32
1. The Eddings Claim
In considering the first substantive issue that Mapes claimed his appellate
counsel omitted, the Sixth Circuit noted that his counsel did not raise an Eddings
v. Oklahoma33 claim that the trial court refused to allow the jury to consider
relevant mitigating evidence in its sentencing decision.34 During sentencing, the
only mitigating evidence Mapes offered was "an unsworn statement that he was
only 18 years old at the time of the New Jersey murder, that the [New Jersey]
conviction was really for manslaughter," and that he was not the triggerman in
the New Jersey crime.35 The trial judge instructed the jury that they could not
"consider mitigating evidence related to Mapes's prior murder conviction." 36
Although Mapes's trial counsel objected to the instruction, his appellate counsel
did not raise an Eddings claim on appeal.37
28. Mapes, 388 F.3d at 191; see Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687 (1984) (setting the
standard for a court's review of counsel's performance under an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim).
29. Mapes, 388 F.3d at 191.
30. Id. (quoting Mapes, 171 F.3d at 427-28).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
34. Mapes, 388 F.3d at 191-92; see Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104,110 (1982) (stating
that "[t]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer... not be precluded
from considering, as a mifigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death").
35. Mapes, 388 F.3d at 189.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 189-90;seeMapes, 171 F.3d at 417-19 (detailing the consequences of the trial court's
instruction and its probable violation of Eddings).
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Ohio argued on appeal that Mapes's appellate counsel were not ineffective
as to this issue because the claim was not "significant and obvious."38 Rejecting
this argument, the Sixth Circuit ruled that the Eddings claim was indeed significant
and obvious because the judge's instruction was reversible error and the Supreme
Court had decided Eddings a year before Mapes's trial." The court also found
that the Eddings claim was stronger than the claims appellate counsel had made
on direct appeal because those claims focused on the guilt phase, "despite the
overwhelming evidence of Mapes's guilt," and "were asserted in the face of
established law to the contrary."4 Because trial counsel had objected to the
instruction at trial, Mapes's appellate counsel were put on notice of the error and
could have had no reasonable strategy for excluding the claim, especially given
the fact that the error was subject to review.4 ' The court further noted that
Mapes's appellate counsel had no experience in capital appeals and could not
explain their appeal strategy.42 The court concluded that counsel did not act
reasonably and prejudiced Mapes's appeal "so as to render [it] unfair and the
result unreliable," thus satisfying both prongs of the Strickland ineffectiveness
test.
43
2. Other Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims
Although the district court found appellate counsel ineffective on two other
claims, the Sixth Circuit held that the Eddings claim was sufficient to demonstrate
that "Mapes was denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel."'  Conse-
quently, it did not consider the district court's finding that Mapes's appellate
counsel failed to raise a claim that the trial court erred in instructing "the jurors
that they could not consider giving Mapes a life sentence unless they first unani-
mously rejected the death penalty."45 The district court had also found that
appellate counsel failed by omitting a claim that the jury verdict might not have
been unanimous because a juror "gave an equivocal response during polling."'
The Sixth Circuit expressed no further opinion about these claims.47





43. Id. at 193.
44. Mapes, 388 F.3d at 193.
45. Id. at 189-90; seeMapes, 171 F.3d at 416-17 (detailing the problems with the acquittal-first
instruction).
46. Mapes, 388 F.3d at 190; see Mapes, 171 F.3d at 422-24 (exploring the issue prompted by
juror Chatman's statement when asked if the verdict was hers that "[i]t's to me, it's the State's
verdict").




The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of a writ of habeas
corpus conditioned upon Ohio's giving Mapes a new appeal within ninety days.
4 8
Mapes claimed that because the court found errors of constitutional significance
in his sentencing proceeding, he deserved to have his sentence vacated and to be
granted a new sentencing hearing.49 Mapes also argued that Ohio law requires
the imposition of a life sentence if the trial court erred in its instructions to the
jury during the sentencing phase of a capital trial."0 Mapes argued that the court
should, in the interest of efficiency, cut out the superfluous judicial proceedings
and require a new sentencing hearing."'
In response to Mapes's argument for relief, the Sixth Circuit clearly stated
that it was making no actual ruling on the Eighth Amendment Eddings error at
Mapes's sentencing.52 The court explained that it could not rule on the Eighth
Amendment issue in a federal habeas corpus proceeding because counsel had
failed to raise the claim on direct appeal and thus had procedurally defaulted it.
53
The issue that it could decide was the Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, and to do so, it did not need to determine if the underlying claim
would have succeeded, only if there was a " 'reasonable probability' " that it
would have succeeded.5 4 The court stated that it was required under United States
v. Morrison"5 to tailor the remedy for the Sixth Amendment violation to the injury
it created. 6 Because Mapes's injury was a botched appeal, the court concluded,
his remedy could only be a new appeal.57 The Sixth Circuit did not foreclose the
possibility that a future federal court might grant habeas corpus relief for the
Eighth Amendment Eddings violation, but it chose to allow the Ohio courts to
consider the issue first, citing the procedural bar doctrine.
58
48. Id. at 189, 193.
49. Id. at 193.
50. Id. at 194.
51. Id. at 193-95.
52. Id. at 194.
53. Mapes, 388 F.3d at 194.
54. Id. (quoting Smith v. Robbins, 538 U.S. 259, 285 (2000)).
55. 449 U.S. 361 (1981).
56. Mapes, 388 F.3d at 194; see United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981) (requiring
that a court addressing a Sixth Amendment violation tailor the remedy to the injury suffered).
57. Mapes, 388 F.3d at 194.
58. Id. at 195.
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IV. Application in Virinia
A. Procedural Bar
Mapes v. Tate presents in bold detail the difficulties appellate and habeas
counsel can face in procedural bar states. In Virginia, appellate counsel may not
raise a claim on appeal unless trial counsel immediately objected to it when it
occurred in trial.' 9 Such a rule creates a problem for appellate counsel, for they
cannot raise potentially successful claims if trial counsel were not diligent and
persistent in objecting to potential errors during trial. If counsel's failure to
object does not rise to the level of Strickland ineffectiveness, then the defendant
loses claims for relief and will also not be able to achieve relief on a Strickland
claim.
Such troubles multiply for habeas counsel in both pre- and post-AEDPA
cases because both federal habeas corpus regimes prevent the federal courts from
granting relief if the issue was not raised before the state courts and if the state
courts rejected the claim on an "independent and adequate state procedural
rule."6° Consequently, trial or appellate counsel who fail to raise timely objec-
tions also forfeit most chances for relief for their clients in habeas proceedings
on any constitutional claim besides a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective
assistance. As often happens in Virginia habeas cases, the federal court will find
that earlier counsel's deficient performance does not rise to the level of constitu-
tional ineffectiveness, and the client will thus lose potentially successful claims.
Mapes demonstrates the complications that arise even when the postconviction
court finds ineffective assistance: Mapes must go back to state court to plead his
seemingly valid Eddings claim, but he risks the Ohio courts' rejection of that
claim.6" If Ohio does not grant him relief, then he must return to the federal
district court a third time, more than twenty years after his original trial. Mapes's
situation would be even more precarious if his were a post-AEDPA case because
Ohio's potential rejection of his Eighth Amendment Eddings claim could only
garner him relief if the federal court deemed it "contrary to, or... an unreason-
able application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Su-
preme Court of the United States," a difficult standard to meet.12
59. See VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:25 (stating that "[e]rror will not be sustained to any ruling of the trial
court.., before which the case was initially tried unless the objection was stated with reasonable
certainty at the time of the ruling").
60. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (2000)
(stating that a petitioner will not be granted habeas corpus relief if he or she has not "exhausted the
remedies available in the courts of the State"; part of AEDPA).
61. Mapes, 388 F.3d at 195.
62. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see, e.g., McHone v. Polk, 392 F.3d 691, 696 (4th Cir. 2004)
(denying habeas corpus relief because the Supreme Court of North Carolina's application of Brady
v. Mauyand was neither "contrary to" nor "an unreasonable application of" federal law); Wilson v.
Oznint, 352 F.3d 847, 860 (4th Cit. 2003) (vacating district court's grant of relief because the lower
2005]
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B. Mitigation of Priors
More importantly, Virginia practitioners should take note of the importance
of the substantive issue in this case: the Eddings claim that the defendant is
allowed to offer mitigation evidence on " 'any aspect of [his) character or re-
cord."' 63 Evidence of mitigating factors in prior criminal and unadjudicated acts
of the defendant surely will be relevant to the defendant's "character or record,"
and counsel must be sure to include them in a presentation of mitigation evi-
dence. The Sixth Circuit emphasized that the right to mitigate prior offenses was
established law even in 1983 and that the failure of Mapes's trial judge to allow
him to offer such evidence in mitigation was both "significant and obvious.""M
That the court found appellate counsel's failure to raise the claim on appeal
egregious enough to constitute a viable Strickland claim emphasizes the impor-
tance of counsel's duty to ensure that the jury receives all possible mitigating
evidence.6"
Capital defense counsel should make sure to conduct a thorough investiga-
tion to uncover all possible mitigating factors relevant to the client's prior
convictions. In Virginia, counsel should also pay particular attention to mitiga-
tion in the context of unadjudicated offenses. Such an investigation is crucial,
especially when the Commonwealth is relying on those prior offenses to make
its case for death under the future dangerousness aggravator.66
V. Conclusion
Mapes v. Tate illustrates the importance of investigating and presenting a
complete case in mitigation at the sentencing phase of any capital trial. The
United States Supreme Court's 1982 ruling in Eddings clearly requires trial courts
court did not properly apply the AEDPA standard to the Supreme Court of South Carolina's
evaluation of Wilson's claim that his guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary); Reid
v. True, 349 F.3d 788,802 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that the Supreme Court of Virginia's application
of Strickland to Reid's 1AC claim was not unreasonable); Kasi v. Angelone, 300 F.3d 487, 497 (4th
Cir. 2002) (denying Kasi's appeal because the Supreme Court of Virginia's treatment of his claims
was neither "contrary to" nor "an unreasonable application of" federal law); Beck v. Angelone, 261
F.3d 377, 391-92 (4th Cir. 2001) (denying Beck a certificate of appealability because reasonable
jurists could not disagree that the Supreme Court of Virginia unreasonably applied federal law);
Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F.3d 348,363 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that the Supreme Court of Virginia's
application of Sticklandwas neither "contrary to" nor "an unreasonable application of" federal law).
63. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 110 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)).
64. Mapes, 388 F.3d at 192.
65. Id. at 193.
66. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (Michie 2004) (stating that "a sentence of death shall
not be imposed unless. . . after consideration of the past criminal record of convictions of the
defendant, [the jury or court finds] that there is a probability that the defendant would commit
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society").
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to allow juries to consider all relevant mitigating evidence, which includes any
evidence that may mitigate prior offenses. This case also presents the conun-
drum of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The Sixth Circuit granted
Mapes relief, but only conditioned upon Ohio's giving him a new appeal.
Although Mapes had a clear and strong constitutional issue that would generally
require resentencing-and in Ohio that resentencing would mean life-Mapes
must wait and give his new counsel a chance to be effective on appeal. In order
to give the State a chance to correct its own mistakes, the Sixth Circuit must
extend the appeals process through at least one more proceeding. Virginia
practitioners should do their best to head off these problems with complete
mitigation investigations and timely objections at trial to any violation of the right
to have all mitigating factors considered at sentencing.
Tamara L. Graham

